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French decentralisation reform includes a reduction in 
the number of communes through the promotion of 
»new communes«. After the failures of 1959 and 1971, a 
new attempt started in 2010. The »new commune« is an 
example of a new, improved and modernized system for 
merging communes. It is a simpler and more flexible than 
the earlier system enacted in the Marcellin Law of 1971. 
From a modern perspective, mostly inspired by the school 
of the New Public Management, the merger of communes 
should save money and improve local public management. 
Legal and institutional analysis shows certain advantages 
and some critical points in that regard. 
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The French decentralization reform is extensive in scope, and includes 
a reduction in the number of communes through the promotion of 
»new communes«. It ended in adoption of a law on December 16th, 2010 
(Law n°2010–1563; Verpeaux, 2011). After the failures of 1959 and 1971, 
this was the third French attempt to decrease the number of French com-
munes. While some reactions are favourable, there is also resistance, in 
particular from within the rural population, those most directly concerned 
by the communal upheaval. 
For its part, the socialist opposition group in the Parliament fought against 
the reform, especially against the creation of new communes, in the name 
of defending the democratic advantage in the high number of French 
communes. Thus, deputy Marc Dolez expressed: 
»We reaffirm our unswerving attachment to the 36,000 communes1 
of our country, because we believe that, thanks to them, the Re-
public has taken root in every part of the territory. The commune 
represents the first level of our democracy.2 There have been 36,000 
of them – and even a few more – created since the French Revolu-
tion. Indeed, it created them from parishes; there were 44,000 at 
the time.3 Today there are still a few more than 36,000. Therefore, 
we, for our part, are profoundly attached to this particular French 
characteristic, that many are inclined to question. Moreover, this is 
the philosophy of the bill that has been presented to us: it is a mat-
ter of putting an end to what one referred to as the disintegrating 
communal system, while, in our opinion, having 36,000 communes 
and a network of 500,000 elected local representatives throughout 
1  Only 2.3 per cent of French communes have more than 10,000 inhabitants and, 
apart from the symbolic and historical case of communes without inhabitants, 90 per cent of 
them have fewer than 2,000 habitants.
2  The decree of June 10–11, 1793 states, in Article 2, that a commune is a society 
of citizens united by local relations. The decree of July 17–18, 1793 eliminates all surviving 
feudal rights. The decree of 31 October, 1793, by which the National Convention decreed 
that all denominations of cities, boroughs and villages were hereby eliminated, and that of 
commune replaced them, standardized the vocabulary.
3  The first text to assert the equality of treatment of towns and of the countryside was 
the decree of December 14 and 22,1789. This decree of the National Assembly asserted that 
there would be a municipality in each town, borough, parish, or country community. The 
towns were no longer privileged territories after the declaration of August 4, 1789 aboli shed 
their privileges.
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our territory is a considerable advantage for the Republic and for our 
democracy.« (Dolez, 2010). 
Nonetheless, there is room for scepticism about this common notion of 
the »democratic richness« stemming from the profusion of French com-
munes when an eminent legal specialist on decentralization, a former 
mayor himself, writes that »a certain doubt arises with respect to this 
certainly classic but rather idyllic depiction of local life, which, at best, is 
only true of the small communes« (Debouy, 2007: 323–324).
The legislative majority on the right, currently represented in the National 
Assembly almost exclusively by the UMP, advocates for a managerial ap-
proach to the law through the voice of deputy Dominique Perben, the 
Rapporteur of this law in the Assembly. According to this view, French 
communes are too numerous and far too poor. Thus, the merger of com-
munes, forced or voluntary, is primarily a way to share financial, human 
and material resources, to provide wider and better service.
In sum, while »the addition of more poverty certainly does not create 
abundance« (..., nonetheless, in principle) »the movement to bring to-
gether the savings engendered by combining measures and eliminating 
duplication« should improve local public management of small and medi-
um-sized French communes (Courtois, 2009: 90).
Rightly or wrongly, many think that it is in the procedure of merging com-
munes, or more accurately, in the related omissions or complications, that 
we must find an explanation for the small number of mergers since 1971. 
Thus, they are asking for an improved system, one that is simpler and 
more flexible. In fact, this is what the law has given them.
Furthermore, expectations from the new measure in terms of improving 
public action are high, since the central government is providing finan-
cial incentives to communes interested in merging. Therefore, Articles 21 
to 25 of the Law on the Reform of Territorial Municipalities aim to im-
prove the merger of communes in France, despite the existence of a large 
number of structures of intermunicipal cooperation. They are now subject 
to Chapter III, part 2 of the General Code of Territorial Municipalities 
(CGCT) (Art. L. 2113-1 to L. 2113–22 CGCT). As a consequence, the 
»new commune« is an example of a new, improved and modernized sys-
tem for merging communes.
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2.  An Improved System for Merging Communes
The Government’s wish to replace the system for merging communes, 
created the Marcellin Law of July 16, 1971, with a simpler and more flex-
ible system in terms of the procedure to create »new communes«.
2.1.  A Simpler System
Apparently, the deputies, the Senate (as passed on the first reading, as 
is constitutionally required in France, for any proposed legislation relat-
ed to local government)4 »offered many improvements to the measure 
proposed in Articles 8 to 11 concerning new communes. However, they 
risk never coming into effect. Moreover, the conditions for creating these 
communes have become more problematic« ... Thus, the Law »modified 
the rules for creating new communes to the point of making them more 
restrictive than those currently governing communal mergers. Consulting 
the population, which was only obligatory in the initial text in the absence 
of unanimous agreement of municipal councils, is now required. In addi-
tion, the majority conditions required in this consultation are now con-
siderably more demanding. The creation of a new commune presupposes 
that the project has been approved in each of the communes concerned, 
by a majority of votes cast, representing at least one quarter of registered 
voters in the commune and, in addition, that participation in the vot-
ing is higher than one half of the registered voters in all the communes 
concerned. If such conditions for mergers remain, it is likely that the new 
system of new communes will fail, much like that under the Marcellin 
Law« (Perben, 2010: 53).
The Draft Law, and then the Law, and the CGCT, have all proposed the 
creation of new communes as a replacement for communes and/or some 
establishments for intercommunal cooperation (EPCIs) with their own 
taxation (urban communities, agglomerations or communes) and their 
member communes. The new procedure, as revised by deputies and sena-
tors, concerns the initiative to create a new commune, as well as the ques-
tion of the majority necessary to validate launching of the procedure by an 
EPCI managing its own taxation.
4  Decision of the Constitutional Council n°2011–632 DC of June 23, 2011 relative 
to the Law Regarding the Number of Territorial Councillors of Each Département and 
Region.
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1) The initiative for creating a new commune may be undertaken:
–  by all the municipal councils of communes concerned (1° of Arti-
cle L. 2113-2 CGCT), 
–  at the request of the deliberative body of an EPCI with its own 
powers of taxation (3° of Article L. 2113-2 CGCT), or
–  on the initiative of the central government representative in the 
département (4° of Article L. 2113-2 CGCT).
The senators added paragraph two (2) to Article L. 2113-2 CGCT that 
also recognizes this initiative with at least two-thirds of the municipal 
councils of the commune members of an EPCI with its own powers of 
taxation, representing more than two thirds of their entire population.
According to the Marcellin Law, the merger of communes could be un-
dertaken only on the initiative of adjacent communes. Subsequently, the 
multiplication of authorities who could launch such an initiative did not 
necessarily make the merger procedure any easier, as some claimed. In-
stead increased the chance of it being open.
2) In particular, the recognized initiative of the Prefect of the department 
hints at lively and contentious political games to come. This is all the more 
so since, by 2014, this same participant in decentralized administration 
of the French government is supposed to complete this intercommunality 
throughout France. To do so, this same territory must be indirectly rede-
signed; new communes must be created, to the point where they upset the 
départementale, or indeed regional, borders (Article L 2113–4 CGCT).
Therefore, one might imagine that, along with this role, there might be 
the use or the threat of using the power to launch the procedure to create 
a »new commune«, to force the most reluctant communes to integrate 
either in an EPCI, or in a »new commune«, in the name of an expected 
territorial rationalisation.
Far from procedural simplification, this new responsibility of the Prefect 
may, depending on the political circumstances, sound the death knell for 
many communal liberties in France. Indeed, the life of French communes 
has always been characterized by the principle of free administration of 
their organisation and management. Consequently, encouragement and 
freedom of choice should be the only principles governing the evolution 
of local institutional law. The risk of central government’s recentralization 
is considerable in the matter of creating new communes.
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3) The required majority (the ⅔ of municipal councillors of an EPCI with 
its own powers of taxation representing more than ⅔ of the population) 
demanded by the senators at the end of their first reading to justify the 
initiative of an EPCI asking for its transformation into a »new commune«, 
was simply deleted during the first reading by the National Assembly.
Consequently, the search for simplicity, proclaimed by the deputies, fi-
nally reflects a greater flexibility in the conditions for implementing the 
procedure to create »new communes«, principally when this is done on 
the initiative of the central government or at least of its representative in 
the département.
However, the Senate has managed to reintroduce this qualified majority. 
Thus, the agreement of the strengthened minimal two-thirds majority of 
municipal councils of communes concerned, representing more than two 
thirds of their total population, is now explicit in Article L. 2113-2 CGCT, 
as a necessary condition for the creation of a new commune on the initia-
tive of the deliberative organ of the EPCI (3° of Article L. 2113-2 CGCT) 
or of the representative of the central government (4° of Article L. 2113-2 
CGCT).
Nevertheless, the agreement of the municipal councils is reputed to be 
tacitly favourable to the expiration of a delay of three months from the 
date of notification in each commune concerned, from the deliberation of 
the decision-making body of the EPCI (for no. 3°), or from the prefectural 
decree determining the parameters of the future »new commune« (for no. 
4°). In addition, an absolute majority is sufficient for this agreement since 
no specified majority has been stipulated. Then ... »a certain number« ... 
of communes will therefore »be obliged to merge, not because they wish 
to do so, but under financial pressure« (Néri, 2010). And where is the vox 
populi in this procedure of creating a »new commune«?
2.2. A More Flexible System
The creation of a new commune is characterized by democratic, as well 
as legal flexibility.
1) Democratic flexibility. According to certain deputies of the presidential 
majority, including deputy Perben, the procedure to create a »new com-
mune« would become more flexible, given the elimination of the current 
Article L 2113-3 CGCT. The proposed law under discussion in the French 
legislature had proceeded with its elimination at the beginning of its ex-
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amination by the National Assembly. However, the Senate reintroduced 
it. Article L. 2113-3 CGCT requires a consultation of the populations 
affected by the plan to create new communes. Nevertheless, compared 
to the original text, the text today is less rigid, concerning both the field 
of application of the consultation foreseen in the process of creating the 
new commune, and the majority required in consulting the population in 
order for the project to proceed. Of course, the consultation affects issu-
ing a regular prefectural decree, but the conditions to obtain it make it 
more problematic.
Thus, it is only organized when the demand for the creation of a new com-
mune is not the fruit of consensual discussions among municipal coun-
cils of the communes concerned (paragraph 1, Article L. 2113-3 CGCT). 
Furthermore, this formulation gives the disagreeable impression that re-
course to local consultative democracy is presented as a punishment for 
local elected officials incapable of reaching agreement on the future of the 
intercommunal territory.
Similarly, the majority required for the consultation to allow the enact-
ment of the prefectural decree to proceed is the absolute majority of votes 
cast (knowing that the participation can only be taken into account if it 
involves at least half the registered voters), corresponding to the number 
of votes equal to at least a quarter of registered voters (paragraph 2, Arti-
cle L. 2113-3 CGCT).
The Marcellin Law of 1971 created a merger system based on free choice 
and democracy – no merger without obligatory consultation, and no 
merger of a commune whose inhabitants massively refused. This some-
times tied the hands of the prefect.5
The newly proclaimed democratic flexibility, for its part, signals a certain 
decline in local participatory democracy. How can we refer to flexibility 
when we prevent people even form giving their opinion on the subject of 
what will become of their territory, of its boundaries, in a word, of their 
territorial future? Is this how French politics plans to reconcile the elec-
tors with the political game?
2) Legal flexibility. Fortunately, legal flexibility has arrived, too. Apart from 
its creation, the new commune has also brought along the suppression of 
the EPCI or the communes that it is intended to replace.
5  CE October 20, 2010, Commune de Dunkerque, req. n°306.643, AJDA 2010, 
n°36, p. 2023 (obs. M.-C. de Montecler).
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The new commune is a double local authority (therefore, a moral person 
in public law) since, on the one hand, Article L. 2113-10, paragraph 2, 
CGCT bestows on it the status of a local authority, and, on the other, 
Article L. 2113-1 CGCT subjects it to the rules applicable to communes 
and reattaches it to the second part of the Code affecting the latter.
Therefore, according to the terms of Article L 2113-5 CGCT, the new 
commune logically acquires the rights and obligations of the former EPCI, 
and takes responsibility for all the legal acts, unilateral or contractual, un-
dertaken by the latter. It also takes possession of all its financial, material 
and human assets. In terms of Section IV of the same Article, only the 
prefect of the department can decide on a different devolution of all or 
part of the goods and rights normally acquired by the new commune. This 
sadly reminds of the unfavourable impression of recentralisation pervasive 
throughout the renovation of the system of the merger of communes.
Nonetheless, after tackling the reorganisation arising from the French 
communal and intercommunal landscape, which revealed its limitations 
dating back to the French Revolution, it might be time to shift to another 
more authoritarian, and thus more centralized, form of management, to 
attain communal, or ultimately intercommunal organisational efficacy. 
Contrary to appearances, the system of communal mergers, reformed by 
the Law of December 16th, 2010, has not been without its critics. There-
fore, it remains to be seen whether it meets the objectives of modernity, 
theoretically imputed to it.
3. A Modern System of Communal Mergers
From a modern perspective, mostly inspired by the school of New Public 
Management, the merger of communes should save money and improve 
local public management. Simply put, it should make the latter more ef-
ficient, even if this is spurred by financial incentives.
3.1. A More Efficient System
While the merger of communes through the development of new com-
munes is a solution designed to increase the efficacy of public action, it 
remains to be seen whether this objective is attainable. A balanced as-
sessment is all the more challenging, given that the maintenance of »del-
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egated or associated« communes is not a measure of the efficiency of 
French administrative organisation, especially since the new communes 
do not have a mandate to eliminate the EPCIs to which the communes 
affected will belong.
1) Does the system of new communes respond to a democratic demand 
for greater administrative efficiency? »For a long time, public authorities 
have been concerned about this communal explosion, which means both 
an advantage due to its proximity and the creation of a network on the 
territory, and a loss of efficiency due to its draining of resources. Indeed, 
numerous small communes lack the necessary capacity to manage com-
munity« (Courtois, 2009: 84).
The Marcellin Law of 1971 on Mergers of Communes was a complete 
failure. Thus, from 1971 to 1995, there were 912 mergers of communes, 
affecting 1,308 communes and 151 demergers. Finally, only 1,097 com-
munes were merged out of the 1,308. During the period 1996–2009, only 
31 mergers were recorded for 35 communes involved. At the macro level, 
France had 38,800 communes in 1950 and 36,686 on 1st January 2009.
Certainly, a number of states in the European Union, often the larger 
ones, managed to merge their communes. Between 1950 and 2007, Ger-
many went from 14,338 to 8,414 (a decline of 41 per cent), Austria went 
from 4,039 to 2,357 (a drop of 42 per cent), Belgium went from 2,359 to 
596 (a decline of 75 per cent), Denmark went from 1,387 to 277 (down 
by 80 per cent), the United Kingdom went from 1,118 to 238 (a decrease 
of 79 per cent), and Sweden from 2,281 to 290 (a decline of 87 per cent). 
Only Spain had a smaller decline of 12 per cent (from 9,214 to 8,111 
communes).
Meanwhile, some European countries experienced an increase in the 
number of communes. This was true of Italy, up 4 per cent (7,781 to 
8,101 communes), and the Czech Republic. In 1989, there were 3,527 
communes on the Czech territory while on January 1st, 1994, the Minister 
of the Interior registered 6,243. More than 96 per cent of Czech com-
munes had fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. 
Yet, the history of the practice of mergers under the Marcellin Law, wheth-
er simple or through associations, does not bode well for the success of 
the new commune formula or for attaining its principal and implicit objec-
tive, greater administrative efficiency. Furthermore, all the people met by 
the Senate Rapporteur Courtois expressed the same sceptical attitude to-
wards the measures concerning the new commune (Courtois, 2009: 90).
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2) Is the maintenance of the associated communes and EPCIs an indica-
tor of organisational efficiency? Can the new commune conserve the old 
communes in the form of »delegated communes«, as the new Section 2 of 
the future Chapter 3 (Communes nouvelles) Section 1, Book 1 of the 2nd 
Part of the CGCT (Articles L 2113-10 to 19 CGCT) proclaims?
The new commune could keep some territories instead of associated com-
munes:
–  with a council of the delegated commune,
–  a mayor of the designated commune, along with deputy-mayors, 
–  and a »city hall annex« where residents of the designated com-
mune could take care of their local affairs, an excellent neigh-
bourhood service.
The mayor of the designated territory will be an officer of the state and 
of the police. In short, all the symbols of the commune are maintained 
but in a delegated fashion. In the absence of precision, everything leads 
to conclusion that only the central commune, the »new commune«, has 
legal authority in public law and that it is the sole legal actor recognized 
on the communal territory. 
Consequently, the delegated commune within the new commune is mere-
ly a decentralized communal administration on the territory of the cen-
tral commune. The delegated commune will only exist and take action 
within the legal entity of the new commune, only under the strict control 
of communal institutions of the central commune. The development of 
the delegated commune within the new commune today called the »asso-
ciated commune« is quite similar to the Lithuanian system of communal 
neighbourhood administrations. In administering the local neighbour-
hood, the delegated commune may still risk confusing the French citizens 
who are attempting to understand communal organisation.
This is all the more so since the new French commune might be much 
more modest in size than the Lithuanian commune, which really reflects 
decentralized administration at its best, working efficiently in the daily 
lives of Lithuanian citizens.
Thus, and in all respects, the expected efficiency, in terms of local public 
management of the new commune, may well prove disappointing. Yet, 
what local public management may lose, local neighbourhood democracy 
might preserve, especially since financial incentives to reach that point no 
longer exist, since the first reading in the National Assembly.
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3.2.  A More Encouraging System
The draft law included Article L 2113-21 CGCT that envisaged a finan-
cial incentive paid by the central government to the new communes.
»The draft law envisaged a financial mechanism to encourage the merger 
through the creation of a new grant. This particular grant was equal to 5 
per cent of the amount of the inclusive grant received by the new com-
mune in the year of its creation and would later increase along with its 
share of the average rate of the DGF. However, to avoid a windfall effect, 
Article 8 limits the eligibility for this particular grant: it will not be given to 
new communes merging again within 10 years after the first merger. Yet 
the »new« new commune naturally still benefits from this particular grant 
acquired previously ... The particular grant of 5% of inclusive subsidies 
has drawn a great deal of criticism. For some, such as the national un-
ion of general directors of local authorities of France, overheard by your 
reporter, »the incentive risks being insufficient«. They would have pre-
ferred a more attractive measure. For others, this enhanced grant that will 
be calculated based on the total amount attributed to communities and 
communes will penalize other local authorities. The AMF observes that 
this advantage created to benefit member communes is not justified with 
respect to EPCIs with their own taxation. This is why, following Ms. Jac-
queline Gourault’s proposal, your committee has eliminated an increase 
in the annual inclusive subsidy of new communes. Your legal committee 
has adopted Article 8 thus revised« (Courtois, 2009: 89, 91). 
»At the initiative of its legal committee, the Senate has (therefore) elimi-
nated the permanent financial incentive described in Article 8, essentially 
for the reason that it would lead to a decrease in the resources available for 
the DGF of other communities in the »communal bloc«. This elimination 
is, nonetheless, partially counterbalanced by the introduction, at the initia-
tive of the finance committee of the Senate, of a guarantee in perpetuity 
of receipt of the Rural Solidarity Grant (RSG) by those communes that 
received it before the creation of the new commune« (Perben, 2010: 53).
Despite this remark, the National Assembly did not reintroduce this fi-
nancial incentive because the creation of the new commune comes along 
with other financial advantages. Therefore, the latter will benefit from 
the entire operating grant of all the communes which have thus merged 
(Article L 2113-21), as well as all of the fiscal potential of each of the 
latter (Article L 2113-21) or the rural solidarity grant (Article L 2113-22 
CGCT).
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In the absence of any financial incentive (a new and specific budgetary 
allocation for the new commune) it remains to be determined whether 
the new form communal merger is worth the “financial pain” for the com-
munes concerned. Even if in France, for constitutional reasons, taxes 
must be created by law, local authorities enjoy a certain visibility, and 
especially stability, in terms of the fiscal resources they receive from the 
central government. This is because independence is meaningless if it is 
merely administrative. This is especially the case given that the complexity 
and fiscal inequities at the local level in France are increasingly subject to 
criticism, by both local elected officials and the population itself. 
Furthermore, equalization mechanisms among local communities are 
flawed (Krattinger and Gourault, 2009: 144–146). Therefore, in all re-
spects, they must be reformed (Dauphin, 2009: 866-871). This is what the 
central government determined to do with the 2011 Financial Law in an 
extension of the legislative reform of December 16th, 2010 (Dallier et al., 
2011). This makes the future Article L 2113-23 CGCT less of an incen-
tive, given that the new communes are eligible for communal equalization 
grants according to common law conditions.
4. Conclusion: A New Commune or a Doomed 
Commune?
Finally, what this law, and thereby the status of the new commune, will 
perhaps not manage to achieve, is to reform the culture and history of 
French communal liberties. The proclaimed success or failure of the new 
commune provides ample material for a comparative study of the local 
systems within the European Union, specifically for the Committee of 
Regions. The main lesson is perhaps that local people live closer to the 
land and that they address the people of the state directly; consequently, 
a single local model is unrealistic in all respects. As for identical uniform 
solutions, it is time we stopped dreaming in Technicolor.
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The STaTuS of french »new communeS«
Summary
french decentralisation reform includes a reduction in the number of communes 
(36,686 on January 1st, 2009), through the promotion of »new communes«. 
after the failures of 1959 and 1971, a new attempt started in 2010. The “new 
commune” is an example of a new, improved, and modernized system for merg-
ing communes. It is a simpler and more flexible than the earlier system enacted 
in the marcellin Law of 1971. from a modern perspective, mostly inspired by 
the school of the new Public management, the merger of communes should save 
money and improve local public management. Legal and institutional analysis 
shows certain advantages and some critical points in that regard. The mainte-
nance of “delegated or associated” communes is not a measure of the efficiency 
of french administrative organisation; especially since the new communes do 
not have a mandate to eliminate the establishments for intercommunal coopera-
tion (ePcIs) to which the communes concerned will belong. The absence of any 
financial incentive in case of merger does not add much to the attractiveness of 
territorial mergers.
Key words: decentralisation – france, territorial organisation, mergers system, 
new commune, local public management, administrative efficiency
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STaTuS francuSKIh »novIh oPćIna«
Sažetak
Decentralizacija u francuskoj uključuje smanjivanje broja općina kojih je 1. 
siječnja 2009. bilo 36.686. nakon neuspješnih pokušaja iz 1959. i 1971. 
novi pokušaj je započeo 2010. »nova općina« je primjer novog, poboljšanog i 
moder niziranog sustava spajanja općina. Taj je sustav jednostavniji i fleksibil-
niji od ranijeg koji je bio utemeljen marcellinovim zakonom iz 1971. Gledajući 
s moder ne perspektive inspirirane školom novog javnog menadžmenta, spajan-
je općina trebalo bi dovesti do financijskih ušteda i poboljšanja u lokalnom 
javnom upravljanju. Pravna i institucionalna analiza pokazuje određene pred-
nosti, ali i neke kritične točke u ostvarenju tih namjera. Zadržavanje delegi-
ranih ili pridruženih općina nije mjera koja bi pridonijela efikasnosti francuske 
upravne organizacije, posebno budući da nove općine nemaju ovlast ukinuti 
oblike međuopćinske suradnje kojima će pripadati. nepostojanje financijske 
motivacije u slučaju spajanja ne čini teritorijalno spajanje privlačnijim. 
Ključne riječi: decentralizacija – francuska, teritorijalna organizacija, sustav 
spajanja, nova općina, lokalno javno upravljanje, upravna efikasnost
